Traditional economic analysis has proposed well known remedies to deal with consumption externalities and inefficient technological change in isolation, but lacks a general framework for addressing them jointly. We argue that the joint determination of R&D and consumption externalities is central to health care industries around the world generally, and for the pharmaceutical industry in particular. This is because technological change drives the expansion of the health care sector and altruism seems to motivate many public subsidies such as Medicaid in the US. We stress that standard remedies to the two problems in isolation are inefficient -Pigouvian corrections to consumption externalities are inefficient under technological change and standard R&D stimuli are inefficient because they focus only on consumer and producer surplus, not the altruistic surplus accruing to non-consumers. We provide illustrative calculations of the dynamic inefficiency in the level of US R&D spending due to the inability of innovators to appropriate the altruistic surplus. We find that altruistic gains amount to about a quarter of consumer surplus in the baseline scenario. Our analysis implies that total R&D could be under-provided by as much as 60 percent.
Introduction
A long-standing literature discusses efficient methods of correcting consumption externalities through applying subsidies and taxes that align private incentives with social ones, as first recognized by Pigou (1932) . However, this classic problem assumes that there is no technological change in the good that confers the external effects. An equally long-standing literature tackles the appropriate methods of stimulating innovation, e.g., the analysis of the welfare effects of intellectual property (IP) regulations.
2 However, this literature traditionally posits that there are no external effects in the consumption of the good for which there is technological change.
Little, however, is understood about the principles that should govern many important allocation problems that involve both technological change and external consumption effects.
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Many such allocation problems appear to occur in the health care sector, where one of the major concerns is balancing the altruistic externalities that motivate universal coverage with the technological change that such coverage may induce. 4 Indeed, in the U.S., existing evidence suggests that technological change is the key to the continued expansion of the health care sector (see e.g., Newhouse 1992), close to half of which is paid for by altruistically motivated subsidy programs such as Medicaid.
One may argue that the joint altruism-R&D problem is perhaps the central allocation problem in health care and crucial to understanding whether the growth in health care spending is efficient. Since developed nations implicitly have decided that it is intolerable to let people die or suffer when existing medical technologies can prevent it, public financing often covers such technologies. Yet, such altruistic adoption and use of new technologies should also be evaluated in terms of the technological change they induce. It seems reasonable to argue that the long-run level of health care spending is far more influenced by these important dynamic incentives than the static incentives pre-occupying current analysis by economists.
This general issue of balancing R&D and altruism is even more prominent in the sub-sector of health care made up of pharmaceuticals; the most R&D-intensive of industries and also faced with human-rights based access issues, particularly for poor nations. Indeed, the field of "global health" is often concerned with how to provide drugs to developing nations for diseases such as AIDS, malaria, or tuberculosis. This international global health issue concerns an R&D-altruism allocation problem, in many ways similar to the US domestic universal coverage issue.
Given the importance of this R&D-altruism allocation problem, we analyze whether traditional solutions to the two problems in isolation are efficient. First, we discuss the impact that R&D incentives have on the remedies aimed at solving consumption externalities such as that of altruism in health care. We argue that classic Pigouvian solutions are inappropriate under technological change. For goods with external effects, just as for those without, ex-post static efficiency is generally inconsistent with ex-ante dynamic efficiency. In particular, if Pigouvian subsidies such as Medicaid appropriately reflect the ex-post social value of health care consumption by the poor, then they lead to under-investment in R&D.
Second, we discuss the reverse problem of the impact that consumption externalities have on the appropriate stimulation of R&D. We find that standard remedies to induce the appropriate amount of technological change are inefficient as such remedies focus only on consumer-and producer surplus, not the surplus accruing to those non-consumers affected externally. In the US health care context, rewards to innovation should not be driven only by profits or participants in, say, Medicaid but also by the altruistic surplus for those paying for this program.
To consider the efficiency losses from standard remedies, we provide illustrative calibrations for the U.S. pharmaceutical market for HIV drugs and for the U.S. health care markets more generally under the assumption that standard Pigouvian subsidies underlie public spending. The case of HIV is a particularly relevant, as consumption of those drugs is mostly financed by altruistic Medicaid subsidies, and treatment has undergone tremendous recent technological changes in the mid 1990s. Our baseline calibrations imply that altruistic gains may be as high as 25 percent of consumer surplus, on the order of $99 billion (in 2000 dollars) since the start of the HIV epidemic. For health care generally, our baseline calibrations suggest that altruistic surplus may again be nearly a quarter of consumer surplus, implying estimates of just over $1.1 trillion annually. Given existing estimates of the relationship between R&D and profits, these levels of altruism imply a potential under-investment of 23 percent for research into improved HIV therapies and 61 percent for R&D into the general health care sector as a whole.
The difficulty remains in addressing the complexities of the payer and regulator environments by choosing proper values for a handful of policy parameters; yet, while both our calibrated estimates of altruistic surplus and underinvestment in R&D vary significantly across parameter values, at a minimum, they highlight the potential large magnitudes involved. By construction, we cannot conclude that spending should increase since we posit actual subsidies (reflected by current social welfare programs) correct for the altruistic externalities. However, the results clearly emphasize the potential gains from providing more incentives for R&D by better having the surplus to non-consumers incorporated into the rewards to innovators.
The paper is related to several literatures. First, it is related to the voluminous literature on the appropriate methods of treating externalities without technological change (see e.g., Laffont, 1987 or Tirole 1988 . Second, the paper also extends the classic work on the tradeoffs between direct R&D stimuli (push) and patents and prizes (pull) (see Nordhaus, 1969 and 1972; Wright, 1983; Scotchmer, 2006) . Lastly, it relates to a more policy-oriented literature discussing prizes as rewards for third-world disease R&D (Kremer and Glennester, 2004) .
Consumption Externalities and R&D
Consider an environment with a single potential innovation in the market. 5 We assume that a product, if developed, has external consumption effects. To fix ideas, consider the static social surplus after the technology has been developed given by:
where π(y), s(y), and e(y) reflect profits, consumer surplus, and external effects induced by the output level y. The expected dynamic surplus under R&D spending R is the expected static welfare less R&D spending
where P(R) is the probability of discovery that is increasing in R&D spending. Actual R&D levels are determined by the profitability of the invention once it has been discovered and thus maximize expected profits P(R)π -R. In general, a straightforward consequence of the theory of the second-best is that a single instrument, such as a prize or a patent, cannot correct two sources of inefficiencies in output and R&D markets (Parry, 1995) .
Traditional remedies to correct consumption externalities
That fact that static efficiency through Pigouvian measures is inconsistent with dynamic efficiency is actually analogous to the case of goods with only private consumption effects.
Without externalities, it is well understood that efficient competition after an innovation has been discovered leads to zero profits and hence insufficient R&D incentives, which is of course the common rationale for patents. 
Traditional remedies to stimulate R&D
There is a large literature in economics that discusses the inefficiency in R&D decisions that occur when those who undertake the private cost of R&D, firms, do not receive the full social benefit of that investment (Arrow, 1961; Tirole, 1988; Scotchmer, 2006}. Under no 6 Note that the failure of Pigouvian solutions is not necessarily caused by the fact that patents are second-best methods of stimulating R&D. To illustrate, consider when full-price discrimination among consumers is feasible so that in the absence of externalities, the patent above would induce a first-best allocation. However, even in that case, patents are never first-best when there is an externality. This is because price discrimination does not allow the firm to capture surplus derived from external effects. This implies that under a positive externality, the monopolist always under-invests in R&D. Conversely, when the externality is negative, the producer may over-invest in R&D.
7 A similar example is related to the recent increase in avian flu. Roche Pharmaceuticals, maker of Tamiflu (a recommended treatment for avian influenza), is facing significant pressure from several governments to allow generic distribution of its drug. While Tamiflu is still under patent, a number of Asian governments have threatened to bypass the patent and proceed with generic manufacturing if negotiated licensing fees are too high (Kanter, 2005) .
externalities, the optimal prize is the present value of the social surplus: and always dominates the optimal patent. 8 This is sometimes interpreted to mean that prizes dominate patents when there are no externalities, with the implicit assumption that the organizations selecting the prizes can set them correctly to represent social surplus. This is an assumption that many times may be unwarranted. Further, like patents, prizes have negative efficiency implications since they are financed by distortionary taxes on capital and labor (an issue that, for simplicity's sake, we presently ignore).
These discussions are incomplete however -and thus the remedies implied inefficient -when there are external effects in consumption of the product. This is because only considering consumer and producer (π) surplus as potential candidates to optimally drive R&D decision leaves out the surplus of non-consumers (e). Incorporating the surplus of non-consumers as carrots or sticks for those conducting R&D is outside of traditional analysis of stimulating R&D. This is particularly relevant for global health issues -to induce efficient R&D incentives into diseases present only in poor countries. Without externalities on rich nations, its seems efficient that a disproportionately low share of the world R&D spending on drugs is allocated to third-world diseases even though these diseases may be more prevalent and clinically more devastating. Altruism or selfishly motivated externalities make the global health issue one of allocating resources under external effects of consumption and endogenous technological change.
Therefore, a joint consideration of R&D and externalities further qualifies the evaluation of prizes against patents. In the presence of externalities, we have the classical result that prizes tend to be more favored over patents the more positive the external effects are. 9 However, although not previously recognized, this dominance of prizes under positive external effects depends crucially on how production and distribution take place after the prize has been awarded. The implicit assumption of the method of production and distribution under a prize is that of free and unrestricted licensing of the patent after the discovery, hence generating the competitive output level. If prizes induce ex-post efficiency without externalities, under external effects, prizes with free unrestricted licensing and a competitive level of output may be an inefficient combination. In fact, patents may dominate prizes even under positive external effects.
For example, suppose consumers are too poor to pay variable costs of production, let alone the fixed costs of R&D. This implies that the social surplus consists of the external altruistic effects of richer countries. In this case, patents would allow monopoly power that would not confer any profits, and no R&D spending would take place for any patent length. The patent holder can at most only appropriate consumer surplus, which is zero when consumers cannot pay variable costs. Hence, under free licensing patents would dominate any positive prize. This is because the R&D would be undertaken without distribution, while under a patent, the R&D would not occur. Note that this has little to do with the second-best nature of patents: the problem with patents under altruism is that the output is not sold to those willing to pay for it, that is, the rich. Appropriate R&D incentives in the global health case need to take into account that the main group that benefits in an economic sense is the rich.
Calibration of R&D inefficiencies induced by Pigouvian subsidies in US health care
Given the theoretical importance of altruistic surplus for underinvestment into R&D, this 
Calibrating the External Consumption Effect
In the framework for static efficiency, suppose that for each unit sold, firms receive a perunit subsidy δ in addition to the price consumers pay for that unit, p(y). 10 The static level of social surplus can then be written as:
where the first term is profits, the second term consumer surplus and the third the net altruistic surplus after paying for the subsidy. For a patent monopolist, the profit-maximizing output in the presence of the subsidy is:
Parameterizing Altruism and Demand
We specify the external consumption effect e(y) to take the following form:
This specification captures the public-good nature of the external consumption effect. That is, each of N individuals in a society is assumed to value a fraction, α, of the consumer surplus.
Moreover, altruism is a public good in the sense that each altruists' "consumption" does not preclude that by another. The net surplus enjoyed by altruists is the external consumption effect less the subsidy:
Since each altruist pays only an N th of the per-unit subsidy, as the number of altruists increases, the cost to each of subsidizing a given level of output decreases.
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We assume a constant elasticity of demand q = (β/p) ε , where ε > 0 is the elasticity of demand and β is a parameter that shifts demand outwards. 11 The increase in N, through its effect on the subsidy, will increase output. Specifically, note that the quantity demanded by consumers depends on the price they face which, in turn, depends on the subsidy. The lower perperson cost of subsidizing a given level of output will lead to an increase in the per-unit subsidy, δ, and consequently output. While possibly even leading to on overall increase in per-person costs (δy/N), per-person costs will certainly increase above the level that would prevail if N were to increase without any compensating changes in δ and y.
Optimal Pigouvian Subsidy
The ex-post Pigouvian subsidy is derived by maximizing the parameterized ex-post welfare W(y(δ),δ) with respect to δ. Under constant returns to scale and a constant elasticity of demand, it is straightforward to show (see the Appendix) that the optimal subsidy, demand price, and supply price satisfy: (7) The optimal subsidy is increasing in both the degree of altruism, α, and the number of altruists, N. Note that the optimal subsidy in the presence of a monopolist is higher than that in perfect competition as the monopolist restricts output. Finally, note that while the prices paid by consumers and received by firms are decreasing in α and N, firm profits rise with the degree of altruism and the number of altruists.
Under the assumption that the observed subsidy is the ex-post Pigouvian solution to the problem of external consumption effects, the level of altruism will be identified through the optimality condition:
Note that this condition implies that even in the absence of altruism, there is subsidization to correct the distortion induced by monopoly pricing. 12 It is straightforward to show that under perfect competition, the analog optimality condition is:
Under perfect competition, altruism is necessary for subsidization. Philipson and Jena (2006) estimate the consumer surplus, s, generated by the new HIV/AIDS technologies to be roughly $395 billion since the start of the epidemic nearly 25 years ago. This figure is consistent with standard values of a statistical life year around $100,000 and observed extensions in HIV life-expectancy of roughly five years when averaged across all infected cohorts. In the Appendix, we discuss the methods used to estimate the share of the price that is subsidized (δ/p S =0.5), the demand elasticity (ε=1.25), and the size of the non-consumer pool (N=190 million annually). 13 The demand elasticity is the most indirect parameter to be calibrated, for which we use existing patent expiration data to estimate markups of brands relative to generic competition, and hence demand elasticities-allowing this elasticity to vary within a reasonable range does not, however, alter the qualitative predictions of our calibration.
Calibration for HIV/AIDS
14 These quantities can then be used to identify α, the fraction of the aggregate consumer surplus 12 Moreover, small observed shares are consistent with a negative external consumption effect. Since the subsidy is designed to induce a socially optimal output, if output is observed to be below the level that would be socially optimal in the absence of altruism, it must be because there is a negative externality. 13 As discussed in the Appendix, AIDS medications are largely subsidized by two programs, Medicaid and the AIDS Drug Assistance Program (ADAP), the latter administered through the Federal Ryan White CARE Program.
14 For example, demand for HIV/AIDS drugs may be more elastic because of the natural complementarities between life-extension and the consumption of these drugs.
enjoyed by a single altruist, for either market structure, as well as the aggregate, external value to non-consumers, Nα. For the case of HIV, the aggregate value to non-consumers is a quarter of the consumer surplus (i.e., Nα=0.25). For individuals infected between 1980 and 2000, this amounts to roughly $99 billion under the estimated level of consumer surplus. 15 It is important to note that the magnitude of this effect is driven by the public goods nature of the externality.
To see this more clearly, note that the aggregate external consumption effect of $99 billion 
Calibration for the U.S. Health Care Sector
Recent estimates suggest that healthcare spending in the U.S. has been quite valuable, with consumer benefits of, on average, four to five dollars for every dollar spent. 16 In general, these estimates vary significantly depending on the methods employed, the values of a statistical life year used (e.g., $50,000 per life year implicit in coverage discussions in the United Kingdom Given the share of national health spending accounted for by Medicaid and SCHIP, we therefore assume that the share of the supply price that is publicly subsidized (δ/p s ) equals 0.16, which implies Nα = 0.19ּε. If ε = 1.25, the aggregate value to non-consumers is 24 percent of consumer surplus, which is nearly identical in magnitude to our estimate for HIV/AIDS. As a benchmark case, we consider consumer surpluses arising from total health care spending that range from $5.92 to $7.89 trillions (which imply consumer benefits of four to five dollars for every dollar spent on health care). This implies an altruistic surplus of $1.41 to $1.89 trillion in 2005 alone. This also corresponds to a gross benefit to each altruist of $7,500 to $9,700 annually and a net benefit (gross benefit -cost of subsidy) of $5,900 to $8,100.
Sensitivity Analysis
These calibrated estimates of altruistic surplus are still, of course, subject to much qualification. For example, different estimates of the level of consumer surplus arising from a single dollar of spending presented in the literature will affect our calculations. Note, however, that while the calibrated level of altruistic surplus will vary based on different estimates of consumer surplus, the ratio of altruistic surplus to consumer surplus identified by our model (Nα = 0.19ּε) depends only on estimates of the elasticity of demand. To the extent that the elasticity differs from the assumed value of 1.25, both the ratio and the level of calibrated surplus will of course be affected for any given level of consumer surplus. To evaluate how the calibrated level of altruistic surplus responds to various elasticities of demand and levels of consumer surplus, Table 1 presents different estimates of consumer surplus and elasticities of demand from several studies as well as the calibrated levels of altruistic surplus that those estimates imply. (1) Consumer surplus from one dollar of health spending is based on authors' calculations from each of the studies listed. Ranges of estimates within a study are often due to the population being considered. For example, in Cutler et al. (2006) , consumer surplus of 4 dollars per dollar spent is based on spending to reduce infant mortality, while consumer surplus of 0.15 dollars per dollar spent is based on health spending by individuals aged 65 and above. Elasticity of demand of 1.25 is based on calculations shown in Appendix. A lower point estimate of 0.25 is based on estimated elasticities of demand for all health services summarized in Ringel et al. (2002) . Altruistic surplus is based on authors' calculations. Table 1 illustrates the broad range of calibrated altruistic surpluses that are possible for the level of public health subsidization observed in the US. Depending on the elasticity of demand and the consumer surplus arising from health spending, the associated altruistic surplus calibrated from our model may vary from $94 billion to as much as $4 trillion. For elasticities of demand that are near unity and for consumer surpluses ranging between 3 to 4 dollars for every dollar spent, the calibrated altruistic surplus is just over $1 trillion or a fifth of consumer surplus arising from total health care spending in the US. Regardless of what view one may take on the specific value for money spent on health care, the ranges of values in the literature appear consistent with a reasonable prediction that the altruistic surplus generated by such spending may be quite large.
Implications for Underinvestment in R&D
Given the altruistic surplus implied by our model, we present back-of-the-envelope calculations on the degree of underinvestment into HIV R&D due to non-appropriation of this surplus. To do so requires two pieces of information: the amount of R&D to date and the expected increase in R&D if altruistic surplus were fully appropriated. For the former, Philipson and Jena (2008) report $16 billion (discounted to 1980 and in year 2000 dollars) worth of private R&D into HIV/AIDS to date. For the latter, we use estimates from Finkelstein (2004) that a one dollar increase in the expected discounted present value of market revenue from a particular vaccine induces 5 to 6 cents worth of investment into that vaccine. While the relationship between expected revenues and innovation in the market for vaccines may not be directly comparable to either the market for HIV/AIDS, specifically, or health care, generally, to our knowledge surprisingly little empirical evidence exists on the link between profitability and R&D in health care. An exception is the relationship between market size and pharmaceutical innovation documented by Acemoglu and Linn (2004) . While these authors show that a 1 percent increase in potential market size is associated with a 4-6 percent increase in new molecular entities, they do not calculate how dollar revenues map into dollar R&D expenditures.
Because of the paucity of empirical estimates linking expected revenues to R&D, our calculations should be interpreted not as definitive estimates of underinvestment in R&D but as ballpark figures of the general levels of underinvestment involved.
With estimates of the altruistic surplus for HIV/AIDS around $99 billion, Finkelstein's estimates imply an underinvestment in R&D of $5 billion. These figures suggest that fuller appropriation of non-consumer surplus would have increased R&D by 33 percent of R&D completed to date. Put differently, our figures suggest an underinvestment in R&D of roughly 23 percent. We can compute similar estimates for health care in general which seems all the more relevant since the U.S. Congressional Budget Office conceded in 1998 that no one knew whether current levels of pharmaceutical R&D were optimal (Outterson, 2005) . In 2003, private health care R&D was nearly $35 billion. With a predicted altruistic surplus of, say, $1.1 trillion in that year alone, this implies a potential increase in R&D of $55 billion, suggesting an underinvestment into overall health R&D of nearly 61 percent. With predicted altruistic surplus ranging from $94 billion to $4 trillion, the range of underinvestment in R&D could thus vary from $4.7 billion to as much as $200 billion. While these estimates rest on several strong assumptions regarding market structure, the nature of the altruism externality, and the impact of profits on R&D, they nevertheless highlight the potential magnitude of underinvestment involved. Our calculations also clearly highlight the wide range of estimates possible.
Concluding Remarks
Although traditional economic analysis has proposed well known remedies to deal with consumption externalities and with stimulating appropriate technological change in isolation, it lacks a general framework for addressing these issues jointly. In our view, their joint presence is central to health care industries around the world where altruistically motivated subsidies are the norm and where technological change has driven the expansion of this sector. We considered the inefficiencies induced by using standard remedies to externalities and R&D stimulation. In particular, our baseline illustrative calculations suggest that the aggregate value non-consumers place on the consumption of HIV drugs in the U.S. may be as high as 25 percent of the patients' surplus, with similar estimates true for health care consumption generally. For the case of HIV/AIDS, our baseline calibrations suggest that using this surplus to stimulate investment could raise R&D by as much as 33 percent of total R&D to date.
Our simple analysis suggests several avenues of future research. While both our calibrated estimates of altruistic surplus and underinvestment in R&D appear quite large, it is important to stress that they vary within a wide range of values. Given this uncertainty and the potential magnitude of our results, perhaps the appropriate interpretation of our calibration exercise is that these empirical results must be further refined to provide accurate estimates of altruistic surplus and underinvestment in R&D.
A second area of future research is gaining a better understanding of the efficiency properties of existing policy proposals in the area of providing health care in poor countries, the concern of global health. Existing policy proposals 19 to deal with this implicit externality problem have been ad hoc in the sense that it is not clear which allocation problems the proposed solutions are optimal with respect to. Examples include Sachs et al. (2001) who advocate cost-based pricing financed by donor countries or Lanjouw (2002) who advocates country-and disease-specific cutbacks in IP rights. 20 There is a basic conflict between these policy proposals and an efficient provision of R&D under altruism as they reduce the benefits to innovators. The rewards to innovation should be increased rather than decreased to reflect the value to altruistic nonconsumers.
Related to this problem, the provision of AIDS drugs in poor countries mimics the problem of providing drugs for rare diseases in the U.S., as well as against agents of bio-terror, 21 and it seems that international lessons can be learned from this domestic experience. With the purpose of stimulating R&D into disease classes too rare to generate R&D, the U.S. Orphan Drug Act of 1983 both reduced the cost and raised the benefit of R&D for such rare diseases. 22 If a society cares or wants to provide insurance for those who are unlucky enough to catch uncommon diseases, the social surplus will in addition to consumer surplus contain non-consumer benefits.
The Orphan Drug Act may be interpreted to encourage R&D to reflect altruism, as opposed to international proposals for developing world diseases that discourage R&D in spite of such altruism. The enormous growth in drugs for rare diseases generated by the Orphan Drug Act may contain important lessons for the appropriate international policy. 20 See also Grossman and Lai (2002) who discuss IP protection across countries. 21 In the U.S., the legislation BioShield authorized $5.6 billion over 10 years for the government to purchase vaccines and drugs to fight anthrax, smallpox and other potential agents of bio-terror.
Lastly, the important issue of how world R&D should be financed across countries seems to fall under the aforementioned allocation problem. Many discussions of whether the U.S. is carrying too large a load of financing world drug R&D centers on the fact that about half of world sales are obtained in the unregulated markets of the U.S., with other price-regulated markets free-riding on the R&D investments this yields. The non-exclusivity induced by the free flow of innovations across countries, and the desire to free ride due to that non-exclusivity, entails a classic externality problem in the consumption ex-post, with the additional feature of involving technological change.
Mathematical Appendix
We assume constant returns to scale (constant marginal cost c) and constant elasticity of demand, p(q) = β/(q 1/ε ). The social welfare maximization is: 
describes the monopolist's optimal response to a subsidy δ. Note that p(.) is the price paid by the consumer and δ is the per-unit subsidy received by the monopolist above and beyond the price paid by the consumer. Under our assumptions on demand and production, it is straightforward to show that the monopolist-induced demand price and output satisfy:
We can rewrite the maximization in A1 as follows:
Recalling that p(δ) ≡ p(y(δ)), the first order condition with respect to δ is:
which can be simplified to:
Since by definition, dp(δ)/dδ can be rewritten as dp(y(δ))/dδ, by the Chain Rule, we obtain:
dy dy y dp d y dp d dp
Using A6, we can rewrite A5 as follows:
which, under constant elasticity of demand, can be written as:
Using the expression for p(δ) in A2, we can solve A8 to obtain the optimal subsidy δ as well as the demand price p D (recall that this is equal to p(.)) and supply price p S (note, p S = p D + δ). 
Using A9, we obtain an expression relating the share of total expenditure on drugs that is publicly subsidized (δ/p S ) to the level of altruism and the elasticity of demand. Specifically,
Finally, we can calculate the ratio of profits to social welfare as follows: 
Note that the share of social surplus appropriated to producers is positive since the monopolist operates in the elastic portion of the demand curve (ε > 1).
1996, though it was informally covering some individuals through the Ryan White CARE Program prior to that.
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Since 1995, total spending has increased from $250 million to almost $4 billion, largely due to increased spending on protease inhibitors and nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors. Figure 1 also demonstrates the large share of total spending on HIV/AIDS drugs financed by public sources, nearly 50 percent from 1996 onwards. Based on the above data, we parameterize δ/p S to equal 0.5. 
Elasticity of Demand and the Number of Altruists
We use the familiar monopolist mark-up condition, (p-c)/p = 1/ε to provide an estimate of the elasticity of demand for HIV/AIDS drugs. 28 Using estimates from the literature on the prices of generic drugs relative to their branded counterparts, we assume variable costs to be no more than 20 percent of sales. 29 With constant returns to scale in variable costs, marginal cost is constant and equal to variable cost. This suggests, (p-c)/p = .8 or alternatively that ε = 1.25.
We assume the number of altruists financing HIV drug consumption, N, to equal 190 million annually. This is the average number of adults alive in the U.S. each year from 1980 to 2000. While this figure does not reflect the annual number of tax-payers in the U.S., it does partly 27 Through communication with Kaiser Family Foundation. 28 Since the monopolist only produces in the elastic portion of the demand curve, ε is bounded from below by unity.
29 See Caves, Whinston, and Hurwitz, (1991) . We use the price of generic drugs as an upper bound of the marginal costs of production. The authors estimate that with 20 generic competitors, the ratio of prices between generic and brand drugs is roughly 20 percent.
capture non-working individuals in households who also benefit from the external consumption effect. Note that our choice of N will not alter the aggregate value altruists place on consumer surplus-it simply affects our estimates of the per-altruist external consumption benefit.
